| The Arizona tomb |
Seventy two years ago, the Japanese attacked
Pearl Harbor. More than 2,400 people lost their lives that day. More than 18
ships were sunk or heavily damaged. And more than 130 medals, including 16
Medals of Honor, were awarded to those who fought valiantly that day to defend
Americans against the attack. The next day, President Roosevelt opened his
speech to Congress and the world with the words that December 7 would be “a
date which will live in infamy.” That is certainly the case, and reason for us
to pause 72 years later to remember what happened and to learn some valuable
lessons, especially in context with the recent peace deal with Iran. One
lesson we need to learn again is that politicians and military leaders make
assumptions about the enemy that are wrong. Friends, we are repeating that mistake again
in regards to Iran. Our leaders and citizens in the 1940s falsely thought that Japan
would not attack the United States because we had superior military strength
and excellent industrial capacity. Well, our army in 1941 was the size of
Romania’s army. Our leaders also falsely believed that if Japan dared to attack
us, we would quickly defeat them because of our military and industrial superiority.
We were wrong on both of those counts. Another lesson we should have
learned was never underestimate the capability, resolve and resourcefulness of
the enemy. Most of the military did not respect the fighting abilities of the
Japanese nor did they understand their advanced military technological
innovation of that time. They turned out to be tougher to fight than we
expected and more resourceful than we gave them credit for. Another
lesson we should have learned is to prepare those in uniform for the unexpected,
or as we say today to think out of the box. Although the military in Hawaii were trained
for combat, they were not well trained to defend against an air attack. For
example, new radar was installed on Hawaii, but it was only used an hour a day
for training. Also the radar operators were not adequately trained on how to
determine whether aircraft were friend or foe.
Today as we remember those who died 72 years ago, we will honor their
sacrifice most by learning the lessons from Pearl Harbor so that America will
be prepared for the future because friends I am afraid the Psalm 83 War is on
the immediate horizon and America is spiritually and morally unprepared for
this coming war.
"Reflections
on Pearl Harbor " by Admiral Chester Nimitz.
On Sunday, December 7th, 1941--Admiral Chester Nimitz was attending a concert in Washington D.C. He was paged and told there was a phone call for him. When he answered the phone, it was President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on the phone. He told Admiral Nimitz that he (Nimitz) would now be the Commander of the Pacific Fleet.
Admiral Nimitz assumed command of the Pacific Fleet. He landed at Pearl Harbor on Christmas Eve, 1941. There was such a spirit of despair, dejection and defeat--you would have thought the Japanese had already won the war.
On Christmas Day, 1941, Adm. Nimitz was given a boat tour of the destruction wrought on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese. Big sunken battleships and navy vessels cluttered the waters every where you looked.
As the tour boat returned to dock, the young helmsman of the boat asked, "Well Admiral, what do you think after seeing all this destruction?" Admiral Nimitz's reply shocked everyone within the sound of his voice.
Admiral Nimitz said, "The Japanese made three of the biggest mistakes an attack force could ever make, or God was taking care of America . Which do you think it was?"
Shocked and surprised, the young helmsman asked, "What do mean by saying the Japanese made the three biggest mistakes an attack force ever made?" Nimitz explained:
Mistake number one: the Japanese attacked on Sunday morning.
Nine out of every ten crewmen of those ships were ashore on leave.
If those same ships had been lured to sea and been sunk--we would have
lost 38,000 men instead of 3,800.
Mistake number two: when the Japanese saw all those battleships lined in a row, they got so carried away sinking those battleships, they never once bombed our dry docks opposite those ships. If they had destroyed our dry docks, we would have had to tow every one of those ships to America to be repaired.
On Sunday, December 7th, 1941--Admiral Chester Nimitz was attending a concert in Washington D.C. He was paged and told there was a phone call for him. When he answered the phone, it was President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on the phone. He told Admiral Nimitz that he (Nimitz) would now be the Commander of the Pacific Fleet.
Admiral Nimitz assumed command of the Pacific Fleet. He landed at Pearl Harbor on Christmas Eve, 1941. There was such a spirit of despair, dejection and defeat--you would have thought the Japanese had already won the war.
On Christmas Day, 1941, Adm. Nimitz was given a boat tour of the destruction wrought on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese. Big sunken battleships and navy vessels cluttered the waters every where you looked.
As the tour boat returned to dock, the young helmsman of the boat asked, "Well Admiral, what do you think after seeing all this destruction?" Admiral Nimitz's reply shocked everyone within the sound of his voice.
Admiral Nimitz said, "The Japanese made three of the biggest mistakes an attack force could ever make, or God was taking care of America . Which do you think it was?"
Shocked and surprised, the young helmsman asked, "What do mean by saying the Japanese made the three biggest mistakes an attack force ever made?" Nimitz explained:
Mistake number one: the Japanese attacked on Sunday morning.
Nine out of every ten crewmen of those ships were ashore on leave.
If those same ships had been lured to sea and been sunk--we would have
lost 38,000 men instead of 3,800.
Mistake number two: when the Japanese saw all those battleships lined in a row, they got so carried away sinking those battleships, they never once bombed our dry docks opposite those ships. If they had destroyed our dry docks, we would have had to tow every one of those ships to America to be repaired.
As it is now, the ships are in shallow
water and can be raised. One tug can pull them over to the dry docks, and we
can have them repaired and at sea by the time we could have towed them to
America . And I already have crews ashore
anxious to man those ships.
Mistake number three: Every drop of fuel in the Pacific theater of war is in top of the ground storage tanks five miles away over that hill. One attack plane could have strafed those tanks and destroyed our fuel supply.
That's why I say the Japanese made three of the biggest mistakes an attack force could make or God was taking care of America .
There is a reason that our national motto is, IN GOD WE TRUST.
Mistake number three: Every drop of fuel in the Pacific theater of war is in top of the ground storage tanks five miles away over that hill. One attack plane could have strafed those tanks and destroyed our fuel supply.
That's why I say the Japanese made three of the biggest mistakes an attack force could make or God was taking care of America .
There is a reason that our national motto is, IN GOD WE TRUST.
 |
| Admiral Nimitz briefs FDR, note General MacArthur on FDR's right |
I would like to add to what Admiral Nimitz said by saying mistake
#4 all the ships damaged and sunk at Pearl Harbor were old, the new aircraft
carriers were deliberately kept at sea so that they could not be damaged or
sunk. FDR knew the attack was coming, that is why the aircraft carriers were
kept at sea. He knew that the aircraft carriers were more valuable than the
battle wagons.
We "Truthers" know the deficiencies in 9-11's official explanation and recognize it as a false flag. Some citizens, however, are less acquainted with details of earlier false flags, which identify 9-11 as only the latest entry in an historical pattern.
let me preface this article by stating that sooner or later we would have been fighting the Japanese, Germans and Italians and their allies. It was inevitable that the U.S. would be dragged into WWII.
December 7 is "Pearl Harbor Day." On this day in 1941, the Japanese navy attacked the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor, damaging and/or sinking 18 ships and leaving thousands dead and wounded. This, of course, propelled America into World War II, an involvement which Americans had overwhelmingly opposed before then.
The Second World War accomplished several Illuminati objectives: world government via the UN with its World Bank/IMF subsidiaries; creation of Zionist Israel; strengthening and spreading Communism over half the globe;
and the economic rise of the Arab oil powers.
 |
| "Battle Ship Row"
The contrived sinking of the Lusitania inflamed American public opinion to join WWI, Roosevelt
had been assistant secretary of the Navy, and Churchill head of the British
Admiralty.
|
As President, Roosevelt tried replicating the scenario by provoking Germany - e.g., having U.S. destroyers depth-charge U-boats. The Germans, however, refused the bait, remembering how U.S. entry into World War I had cost them that war.
 |
| Admiral James O. Richardson |
Lt. Commander of Naval Intelligence Arthur McCollum presented the President with an eight-step plan of provocation against Japan, closing with these words: "If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better."
July 1941 brought the most severe measures: The U.S. and Britain froze all Japanese assets, and embargoed trade, most critically oil. (This is what we and our allies did to Iran.) We shouldn't overlook that Germany and her allies had invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. The embargo effectively ensured that Japan, which had signed the anti-Comintern Pact with Germany, would not join the invasion but instead focus on Southeast Asia, where oil and rubber beckoned.
Stationed in Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Pacific fleet provided tempting bait. Our ships were isolated, boxed together like sardines, approachable by attackers from 360 degrees, and 2000 miles from supplies. Roosevelt fired Fleet Commander Admiral J. O. Richardson for protesting this absurd decision.
| Kimmel took the blame for Pearl Harbor |
 |
| Henry Stimson was a member of Skull and Bones |
That autumn, after meetings with FDR, War Secretary Henry Stimson (CFR, Skull and Bones) wrote in his diary: "We face the delicate question of the diplomatic fencing to be done so as to be sure Japan is put into the wrong and makes the first bad move - overt move...The question was how we should maneuver them [the Japanese] into the position of firing the first shot...."
In 1940, U.S cryptanalysts had broken Japan's diplomatic code, "Purple," and were reading its messages, often on a same-day basis. The intercepts were regularly sent to President Roosevelt, Chief of Staff General George Marshall, and other high Washington officials - but not our commanders in Hawaii. In my opinion if the If the intercepts had been sent to Kimmel and Short they would have been more prepared.
The intercepts revealed war was imminent, and that Japanese spies in Honolulu were reporting the exact locations of American warships in dock. Washington decoded Japan's declaration of war before their ambassadors presented it to Secretary of State Cordell Hull.
The United States also cracked Japan's naval code, and was translating its naval dispatches, including Admiral Yamamoto's directive to the Japanese First Air Fleet on November 26, 1941 to "advance into Hawaiian waters" and "attack the main force of the United States fleet and deal it a mortal blow."
OTHER FOREKNOWLEDGE
Warnings of Japanese intentions to strike Pearl Harbor also came to the President from: our ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew; FBI director J. Edgar Hoover (based on information from double agent Dusko Popov); Senator Guy Gillette (acting on a tip from the Korean underground), and Congressman Martin Dies. Chief of Staff George Marshall was forewarned of the attack by the U.S. military observer in Java, Brigadier General Elliot Thorpe, as well as by the Dutch Military attaché in Washington, Colonel F. G. L. Weijerman. If all these people knew of Japanese intentions to attack then FDR knew.
None of this information was conveyed to Pacific Fleet Commander Kimmel, or General Walter Short, the army commander in Hawaii. After the disaster, and war began, Americans and Congress demanded accountability. Why had our military been caught off guard?
President Roosevelt appointed an investigative body - the Roberts Commission, dominated by friendly acquaintances of himself and General Marshall. The Commission declared Washington had discharged its duties superlatively. It concluded the blame for Pearl Harbor lay with Admiral Kimmel and General Short, alleging they had failed to take adequate defensive and surveillance measures. Kimmel and Short were relieved of their commands as "DERELICTION OF DUTY" blazed on headlines across the country
Kimmel and Short protested the findings of the Roberts Commission, which had included unsworn and unrecorded testimony, denied them the privilege of attorneys, and numerous other irregularities. Kimmel and Short asked that they be court-martialed, so that the matter of Pearl Harbor could be resolved in a bona fide courtroom using established rules of evidence. Dreading this, the Roosevelt administration forbade trials "until such time as the public interest and safety would permit."
In 1944 a Congressional resolution mandated the trials. That August, the Navy Court of Inquiry and Army Pearl Harbor Board convened. At these proceedings, Kimmel's and Short's attorneys presented undeniable proof that Washington had complete foreknowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack. The Navy Court exonerated Kimmel of all charges and laid the blame squarely on Washington. The Army Pearl Harbor Board's report closed with these words: "Up to the morning of December 7, 1941, everything that the Japanese were planning to do was known to the United States."
However, the American people did not learn the trial results, because the Roosevelt administration ordered the verdicts made confidential, pleading national security reasons. Meanwhile, 33rd-degree Freemason Roosevelt ordered NEW investigations to refute the trial results. In these "new" investigations, a number of officers - career military men with their futures now on the line - were persuaded to reverse their testimonies. The new investigations shifted the bulk of blame back to Kimmel and Short. Thus when the government finally released its findings, the public never understood what had happened.
The man in charge of the army's investigation was Lieutenant Colonel Henry Clausen, who later became Sovereign Grand Commander of the Scottish Rite in the Southern Jurisdiction, same position Albert Pike held.
In September 2000 - one year before 9-11 - the Project for a New American Century (Richard Perle, Paul Wolofowitz, etc.) - issued a paper, "Rebuilding America's Defenses," calling for an increased U.S. military presence in the Middle East. But, it warned, the "transformation ...is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event - like a new Pearl Harbor." In May 2001, as the 9-11 countdown began, Disney released its war-rallying Pearl Harbor starring Ben Affleck.
 |
| Arthur McCollum obviously rose in rank |
On October 7, 1940, Lieutenant Commander Arthur McCollum of the
Office of Naval Intelligence submitted a memo to Navy Captains Walter Anderson
and Dudley Knox (whose endorsement is included in the following scans). Captains Anderson and Knox were
two of President Roosevelt's most trusted military advisors.
| Admiral Anderson, advisor to FDR |
The memo below,
detailed an 8 step plan to provoke Japan into attacking the United States.
President Roosevelt, over the course of 1941, implemented all 8 of the
recommendations contained in the McCollum memo. Following the eighth
provocation, Japan attacked. The public was told that it was a
complete surprise, an "intelligence failure", and America entered
World War Two.
0p-16-F-2
ON1 7 October 1940
Memorandum for the Director
Subject: Estimate of the Situation in the Pacific and
Recommendations for Action by the United States.
1. The United States today finds herself confronted
by a hostile Germany and Italy in Europe and by an equally
hostile Japan in the Orient. Russia, the great land link between these two groups of hostile powers, is at present neutral, but in all probability favorably inclined towards the Axis powers, and her favorable attitude towards these powers may be expected to increase in direct proportion to increasing success in their prosecution of the war in Europe. Germany and Italy have been successful in war on the continent of Europe and all of Europe is either under their military control or has been forced into subservience. Only the British Empire is actively opposing by war the growing world dominance of Germany and Italy and their satellites.
2. The United States at first remained coolly aloof
from the conflict in Europe and there is considerable evidence to support the view that Germany and Italy attempted by every method within their power to foster a continuation of American indifference to the outcome of the struggle in Europe. Paradoxically, every success of German and Italian arms has led to further increases in United States sympathy for and material support of the British Empire, until at the present time the United States
government stands committed to a policy of rendering every
support short of war the changes rapidly increasing that
the United States will become a full fledged ally of the British Empire in the very near future. The final failure of German and Italian diplomacy to keep the United States in the role of a disinterested spectator has forced them to adopt the policy of developing threats to U.S. security in other spheres of the world, notably by the threat of revolutions in South and Central America by Axis-dominated groups and by the stimulation of Japan to further aggressions and threats in the Far East in the hope that by these mean the Unites States would become so confused in thought and fearful of her own immediate security as to cause her to become so preoccupied in purely defensive preparations as to virtually preclude U.S. aid to Great Britain in any form. As a result of this policy, Germany and Italy have lately concluded a military alliance with Japan directed against the United States. If the published terms of this treaty and the pointed utterances of German, Italian and Japanese leaders can be believed, and there seems no ground on which to doubt either, the three totalitarian powers agree to make war on the United States, should she come to the assistance of England, or should she attempt to forcibly interfere with Japan's aims in the Orient and, [2]
furthermore, Germany and Italy expressly reserve the right to determine whether American aid to Britain, short of war, is a cause for war or not after they have succeeded in defeating England. In other words, after England has been disposed of her enemies will decide whether or not to immediately proceed with an attack on the United States. Due to geographic conditions, neither Germany nor Italy are in a position to offer any material aid to Japan. Japan, on the contrary, can be of much help to both Germany and Italy by threatening and possibly even attacking British dominions and supply routes from Australia, India and the Dutch East Indies, thus materially weakening Britain's position in opposition to the Axis powers in Europe.
In exchange for this service, Japan receives a free hand to seize all of Asia that she can find it possible to grab, with the added promise that Germany and Italy will do all in their power to keep U.S. attention so attracted as to prevent the United States from taking positive aggressive action against Japan. Here again we have another example of the Axis-Japanese diplomacy which is aimed at keeping American power immobilized, and by threats and alarms to so confuse American thought as to preclude prompt decisive action by the United States in either sphere of action. It cannot be emphasized to strongly that the last thing desired by either the Axis powers in Europe or by Japan in the Far East is prompt, warlike action by the United States in either theatre of operations.
3. An examination of the situation in Europe leads
to the conclusion that there is little that we can do now,
immediately to help Britain that is not already being done.
We have no trained army to send to the assistance of England, nor will we have for at least a year. We are now trying to increase the flow of materials to England and to bolster the defense of England in every practicable way and this aid will undoubtedly be increased. On the other hand, there is little that Germany or Italy can do against us as long as England continues in the war and her navy maintains control of the Atlantic. The one danger to our position lies in the possible early defeat of the British Empire with the British Fleet falling intact into the hands of the Axis powers. The possibility of such an event occurring would be materially lessened were we actually allied in war with the British or at the very least were taking active measures to relieve the pressure on Britain in other spheres of action. To sum up: the threat to our security in the Atlantic remains small so long as the British Fleet remains dominant in that ocean and friendly to the United States.
4. In the Pacific, Japan by virtue of her alliance with Germany and Italy is a definite threat to the security of the British Empire and once the British Empire is gone the power of Japan-Germany and Italy is to be directed against the United States. A powerful land attack by Germany and Italy through the Balkans and North Africa against the Suez Canal with a Japanese threat or attack on Singapore would have very serious results for the British Empire. Could Japan be diverted or neutralized, the fruits of a successful attack on the Suez Canal could not be as far reaching and beneficial to the Axis powers as if such a success was also accompanied by the virtual elimination of British sea power from the Indian Ocean, thus [3] opening up a European supply route for Japan and a sea route for Eastern raw materials to reach Germany and Italy, Japan must be
diverted if the British and American ( ) blockade of Europe
and possibly Japan (?) is to remain even partially in effect.
5. While as pointed out in Paragraph (3) there is
little that the United States can do to immediately retrieve
the situation in Europe, the United States is able to effectively nullify Japanese aggressive action, and do it without lessening U.S. material assistance to Great Britain.
6. An examination of Japan's present position as opposed to the United States reveals a situation as follows:
Advantages Disadvantages
1. Geographically strong position 1. A million and a half men
of Japanese Islands. engaged in an exhausting war on the Asiatic Continent.
2. A highly centralized strong 2. Domestic economy and food
capable government. supply severely straightened.
3. Rigid control of economy on 3. A serious lack of sources of a war basis. raw materials for war. Notably
oil, iron and cotton.
4. A people inured to hardship 4. Totally cut off from supplies
and war. from Europe.
5. A powerful army. 5. Dependent upon distant overseas
routes for essential supplies.
6. A skillful navy about 2/3 6. Incapable of increasing
the strength of the U.S. Navy. manufacture and supply of war materials without free access to U.S. or European markets.
7. Some stocks of raw materials. 7. Major cities and industrial centers extremely vulnerable to air attack.
8. Weather until April rendering direct sea operations in the
vicinity of Japan difficult.
7. In the Pacific the United States possesses a very strong
defensive position and a navy and naval air force at present
in that ocean capable of long distance offensive operation. There are certain other factors which at the present time are strongly in our favor, viz:
A. Philippine Islands still held by the United States.
B. Friendly and possibly allied government in control
of the Dutch East Indies.
C. British still hold Hong Kong and Singapore and
are favorable to us.
D. Important Chinese armies are still in the field
in China against Japan.
E. A small U.S. Naval Force capable of seriously
threatening Japan's southern supply routes
[4] already in the theatre of operations.
F. A considerable Dutch naval force is in the
Orient that would be of value if allied to U.S.
8. A consideration of the foregoing leads to the
conclusion that prompt aggressive naval action against Japan by the United States would render Japan incapable of affording any help to Germany and Italy in their attack on England and that Japan itself would be faced with a situation in which her navy could be forced to fight on most unfavorable terms or accept fairly early collapse of the country through the force of blockade.
A prompt and early declaration of war after entering into suitable arrangements with England and Holland, would be most effective in bringing about the early collapse of Japan and thus eliminating our enemy in the pacific before Germany and Italy could strike at us effectively. Furthermore, elimination of Japan must surely strengthen Britain's position against Germany and Italy and, in addition, such action would increase the confidence and support of all nations who tend to be friendly towards us.
9. It is not believed that in the present state of
political opinion the United States government is capable of
declaring war against Japan without more ado; and it is barely possible that vigorous action on our part might lead the Japanese to modify their attitude. Therefore, the following course of action is suggested:
A. Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of
British bases in the Pacific, particularly
Singapore.
B. Make an arrangement with Holland for the use of
base facilities and acquisition of supplies
in the Dutch East Indies.
C. Give all possible aid to the Chinese government
of Chiang-Kai-Shek.
D. Send a division of long range heavy cruisers to
the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore.
E. Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient.
F. Keep the main strength of the U.S. fleet now in
the Pacific in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands.
G. Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese
demands for undue economic concessions,
particularly oil.
H. Completely embargo all U.S. trade with Japan,
in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed
by the British Empire.
10. If by these means Japan could be led to commit an
overt act of war, so much the better. At all events we must be fully prepared to accept the threat of war.
A. H. McCollum
CC-0p-16
0p-16-F
File
[5]
0p-16-F-2 ON1 7 October 1940
Summary
1. The United States is faced by a hostile combination of
powers in both the Atlantic and Pacific.
2. British naval control of the Atlantic prevents hostile
action against the United States in this area.
3. Japan's growing hostility presents an attempt to open sea
communications between Japan and the Mediterranean by an attack on the British lines of communication in the
Indian Ocean.
4. Japan must be diverted if British opposition in Europe is
to remain effective.
5. The United States naval forces now in the Pacific are
capable of so containing and harassing Japan as to nullify
her assistance to Germany and Italy.
6. It is to the interest of the United States to eliminate
Japan's threat in the Pacific at the earliest opportunity
by taking prompt and aggressive action against Japan.
7. In the absence of United States ability to take the
political offensive, additional naval force should be
sent to the orient and agreements entered into with Holland
and England that would serve as an effective check against
Japanese encroachments in South-eastern Asia.
[6]
Comment by Captain Knox
It is unquestionably to out general interest
that Britain be not licked - just now she has a stalemate
and probably cant do better. We ought to make it certain
that she at least gets a stalemate. For this she will probably
need from us substantial further destroyers and air reinforcements to England. We should not precipitate anything in the Orient that should hamper our ability to do this - so long as probability continues.
If England remains stable, Japan will be cautious
in the Orient. Hence our assistance to England in the Atlantic
is also protection to her and us in the Orient.
However, I concur in your courses of action
we must be ready on both sides and probably strong enough
to care for both.
D.W.K.
Re your #6: - no reason for battleships not
visiting west coast in bunches.
Subject: Estimate of the Situation in the Pacific and
Recommendations for Action by the United States.
1. The United States today finds herself confronted
by a hostile Germany and Italy in Europe and by an equally
hostile Japan in the Orient. Russia, the great land link between these two groups of hostile powers, is at present neutral, but in all probability favorably inclined towards the Axis powers, and her favorable attitude towards these powers may be expected to increase in direct proportion to increasing success in their prosecution of the war in Europe. Germany and Italy have been successful in war on the continent of Europe and all of Europe is either under their military control or has been forced into subservience. Only the British Empire is actively opposing by war the growing world dominance of Germany and Italy and their satellites.
2. The United States at first remained coolly aloof
from the conflict in Europe and there is considerable evidence to support the view that Germany and Italy attempted by every method within their power to foster a continuation of American indifference to the outcome of the struggle in Europe. Paradoxically, every success of German and Italian arms has led to further increases in United States sympathy for and material support of the British Empire, until at the present time the United States
government stands committed to a policy of rendering every
support short of war the changes rapidly increasing that
the United States will become a full fledged ally of the British Empire in the very near future. The final failure of German and Italian diplomacy to keep the United States in the role of a disinterested spectator has forced them to adopt the policy of developing threats to U.S. security in other spheres of the world, notably by the threat of revolutions in South and Central America by Axis-dominated groups and by the stimulation of Japan to further aggressions and threats in the Far East in the hope that by these mean the Unites States would become so confused in thought and fearful of her own immediate security as to cause her to become so preoccupied in purely defensive preparations as to virtually preclude U.S. aid to Great Britain in any form. As a result of this policy, Germany and Italy have lately concluded a military alliance with Japan directed against the United States. If the published terms of this treaty and the pointed utterances of German, Italian and Japanese leaders can be believed, and there seems no ground on which to doubt either, the three totalitarian powers agree to make war on the United States, should she come to the assistance of England, or should she attempt to forcibly interfere with Japan's aims in the Orient and, [2]
furthermore, Germany and Italy expressly reserve the right to determine whether American aid to Britain, short of war, is a cause for war or not after they have succeeded in defeating England. In other words, after England has been disposed of her enemies will decide whether or not to immediately proceed with an attack on the United States. Due to geographic conditions, neither Germany nor Italy are in a position to offer any material aid to Japan. Japan, on the contrary, can be of much help to both Germany and Italy by threatening and possibly even attacking British dominions and supply routes from Australia, India and the Dutch East Indies, thus materially weakening Britain's position in opposition to the Axis powers in Europe.
In exchange for this service, Japan receives a free hand to seize all of Asia that she can find it possible to grab, with the added promise that Germany and Italy will do all in their power to keep U.S. attention so attracted as to prevent the United States from taking positive aggressive action against Japan. Here again we have another example of the Axis-Japanese diplomacy which is aimed at keeping American power immobilized, and by threats and alarms to so confuse American thought as to preclude prompt decisive action by the United States in either sphere of action. It cannot be emphasized to strongly that the last thing desired by either the Axis powers in Europe or by Japan in the Far East is prompt, warlike action by the United States in either theatre of operations.
3. An examination of the situation in Europe leads
to the conclusion that there is little that we can do now,
immediately to help Britain that is not already being done.
We have no trained army to send to the assistance of England, nor will we have for at least a year. We are now trying to increase the flow of materials to England and to bolster the defense of England in every practicable way and this aid will undoubtedly be increased. On the other hand, there is little that Germany or Italy can do against us as long as England continues in the war and her navy maintains control of the Atlantic. The one danger to our position lies in the possible early defeat of the British Empire with the British Fleet falling intact into the hands of the Axis powers. The possibility of such an event occurring would be materially lessened were we actually allied in war with the British or at the very least were taking active measures to relieve the pressure on Britain in other spheres of action. To sum up: the threat to our security in the Atlantic remains small so long as the British Fleet remains dominant in that ocean and friendly to the United States.
4. In the Pacific, Japan by virtue of her alliance with Germany and Italy is a definite threat to the security of the British Empire and once the British Empire is gone the power of Japan-Germany and Italy is to be directed against the United States. A powerful land attack by Germany and Italy through the Balkans and North Africa against the Suez Canal with a Japanese threat or attack on Singapore would have very serious results for the British Empire. Could Japan be diverted or neutralized, the fruits of a successful attack on the Suez Canal could not be as far reaching and beneficial to the Axis powers as if such a success was also accompanied by the virtual elimination of British sea power from the Indian Ocean, thus [3] opening up a European supply route for Japan and a sea route for Eastern raw materials to reach Germany and Italy, Japan must be
diverted if the British and American ( ) blockade of Europe
and possibly Japan (?) is to remain even partially in effect.
5. While as pointed out in Paragraph (3) there is
little that the United States can do to immediately retrieve
the situation in Europe, the United States is able to effectively nullify Japanese aggressive action, and do it without lessening U.S. material assistance to Great Britain.
6. An examination of Japan's present position as opposed to the United States reveals a situation as follows:
Advantages Disadvantages
1. Geographically strong position 1. A million and a half men
of Japanese Islands. engaged in an exhausting war on the Asiatic Continent.
2. A highly centralized strong 2. Domestic economy and food
capable government. supply severely straightened.
3. Rigid control of economy on 3. A serious lack of sources of a war basis. raw materials for war. Notably
oil, iron and cotton.
4. A people inured to hardship 4. Totally cut off from supplies
and war. from Europe.
5. A powerful army. 5. Dependent upon distant overseas
routes for essential supplies.
6. A skillful navy about 2/3 6. Incapable of increasing
the strength of the U.S. Navy. manufacture and supply of war materials without free access to U.S. or European markets.
7. Some stocks of raw materials. 7. Major cities and industrial centers extremely vulnerable to air attack.
8. Weather until April rendering direct sea operations in the
vicinity of Japan difficult.
7. In the Pacific the United States possesses a very strong
defensive position and a navy and naval air force at present
in that ocean capable of long distance offensive operation. There are certain other factors which at the present time are strongly in our favor, viz:
A. Philippine Islands still held by the United States.
B. Friendly and possibly allied government in control
of the Dutch East Indies.
C. British still hold Hong Kong and Singapore and
are favorable to us.
D. Important Chinese armies are still in the field
in China against Japan.
E. A small U.S. Naval Force capable of seriously
threatening Japan's southern supply routes
[4] already in the theatre of operations.
F. A considerable Dutch naval force is in the
Orient that would be of value if allied to U.S.
8. A consideration of the foregoing leads to the
conclusion that prompt aggressive naval action against Japan by the United States would render Japan incapable of affording any help to Germany and Italy in their attack on England and that Japan itself would be faced with a situation in which her navy could be forced to fight on most unfavorable terms or accept fairly early collapse of the country through the force of blockade.
A prompt and early declaration of war after entering into suitable arrangements with England and Holland, would be most effective in bringing about the early collapse of Japan and thus eliminating our enemy in the pacific before Germany and Italy could strike at us effectively. Furthermore, elimination of Japan must surely strengthen Britain's position against Germany and Italy and, in addition, such action would increase the confidence and support of all nations who tend to be friendly towards us.
9. It is not believed that in the present state of
political opinion the United States government is capable of
declaring war against Japan without more ado; and it is barely possible that vigorous action on our part might lead the Japanese to modify their attitude. Therefore, the following course of action is suggested:
A. Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of
British bases in the Pacific, particularly
Singapore.
B. Make an arrangement with Holland for the use of
base facilities and acquisition of supplies
in the Dutch East Indies.
C. Give all possible aid to the Chinese government
of Chiang-Kai-Shek.
D. Send a division of long range heavy cruisers to
the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore.
E. Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient.
F. Keep the main strength of the U.S. fleet now in
the Pacific in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands.
G. Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese
demands for undue economic concessions,
particularly oil.
H. Completely embargo all U.S. trade with Japan,
in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed
by the British Empire.
10. If by these means Japan could be led to commit an
overt act of war, so much the better. At all events we must be fully prepared to accept the threat of war.
A. H. McCollum
CC-0p-16
0p-16-F
File
[5]
0p-16-F-2 ON1 7 October 1940
Summary
1. The United States is faced by a hostile combination of
powers in both the Atlantic and Pacific.
2. British naval control of the Atlantic prevents hostile
action against the United States in this area.
3. Japan's growing hostility presents an attempt to open sea
communications between Japan and the Mediterranean by an attack on the British lines of communication in the
Indian Ocean.
4. Japan must be diverted if British opposition in Europe is
to remain effective.
5. The United States naval forces now in the Pacific are
capable of so containing and harassing Japan as to nullify
her assistance to Germany and Italy.
6. It is to the interest of the United States to eliminate
Japan's threat in the Pacific at the earliest opportunity
by taking prompt and aggressive action against Japan.
7. In the absence of United States ability to take the
political offensive, additional naval force should be
sent to the orient and agreements entered into with Holland
and England that would serve as an effective check against
Japanese encroachments in South-eastern Asia.
[6]
Comment by Captain Knox
It is unquestionably to out general interest
that Britain be not licked - just now she has a stalemate
and probably cant do better. We ought to make it certain
that she at least gets a stalemate. For this she will probably
need from us substantial further destroyers and air reinforcements to England. We should not precipitate anything in the Orient that should hamper our ability to do this - so long as probability continues.
If England remains stable, Japan will be cautious
in the Orient. Hence our assistance to England in the Atlantic
is also protection to her and us in the Orient.
However, I concur in your courses of action
we must be ready on both sides and probably strong enough
to care for both.
D.W.K.
Re your #6: - no reason for battleships not
visiting west coast in bunches.
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