Just Poor Dirt Farmers

GTMO Detainee Shaker Aamer

The case of a Guantánamo detention-camp detainee named Shaker Aamer, an alleged former associate of Osama bin Laden (UBL), has evolved into a perfect example of the dilemmas facing the Obama administration as it tries to shutter the facility: is Aamer truly dangerous or not? And if he leaves Gitmo, where should he go?

Last month, Britain's Home Secretary Jacqui Smith pressed the U.S. government to release Aamer, the last person with U.K. connections held at Gitmo. But according to some U.S. officials and government documents, Aamer is just the kind of detainee whose release could prove unwise.

Two years ago, Pentagon official Sandra Hodgkinson said that Aamer, a Saudi with U.K. residency, had shared a London apartment with Zacarias Moussaoui, convicted for his role in the 9/11 attacks. Government documents also suggest Aamer fought jihad in both Bosnia and Afghanistan and served as an "interpreter" for UBL.

Some Pentagon experts regard Aamer as "an extremely dangerous person." I concur with that assessment based upon my experience at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. At least 18 former detainees have re-entered the world of terrorism and in some cases were killed on the field of battle including Mullah Dadullah who was personally aware of.

But not everyone agrees that Aamer is dangerous. Brent Mickum, his lawyer, insists that claims about his client's Qaeda ties are false.

Shaker contends that at the time of his arrest in Afghanistan, he was working for a Saudi charity; however, in January 2004, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia froze the assets of the Saudi Al-Haramain Foundation for diverting funds to terrorist activities, including those sponsored by the al-Qaeda network.

Yeah, we heard that a multitude of times from detainees claiming they were just poor dirt farmers or that they just went to Afghanistan to build mosques. They falsely claimed they were captured by mistake or because of a clan vendetta against them.

Let’s look at some of the evidence against Aamer. A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for the tribunal, listing the alleged facts that led to his detainment. His memo accused him of the following:

a. The detainee is associated with the Taliban and al Qaeda:

• The detainee arrived in Afghanistan in August 2001.
• The detainee is associated with a known terrorist with ties to al Qaeda.
• The detainee is associated with a second known terrorist with ties to al Qaeda, who is also a suspected hijacker.
• The detainee has traveled internationally on false passports.
• A stolen passport used by detainee was discovered in an abandoned cave in Tora Bora.
• The detainee has received training on the AK-47 rifle.
• The detainee participated in the conflict in Bosnia.
• The detainee has stayed at multiple guesthouses in Afghanistan.
• The detainee has visited the Khaldan terrorist camp.
• The detainee received money from Usama Bin Laden (UBL).
• The detainee taught Arabs to fight during the Bosnia-Serb War.
• The detainee was armed with a 82mm mortar and a M43 120mm mortar.
• The detainee is associated with a non-governmental organization (NGO) that has ties to al Qaeda.
• The detainee has met with UBL and other senior leaders of al Qaeda.
  
  b. The detainee engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.
  
  
• The detainee fought on the front lines in Afghanistan.
• The detainee sent people to the front lines in Afghanistan.
• The detainee was at Tora Bora during the U.S. air campaign.
• The detainee was in charge of a group of fighter at Tora Bora.

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Shakir Abdurahim Mohamed Ameer's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 25 October 2005.The memo listed 36 factors favoring his continued detention. The memo listed 7 factors favoring release or transfer. The 36 factors favoring continued detention asserted:

• He had visited Afghanistan in 1993, stayed in suspect guest houses there;
• He had fought in Bosnia in 1994;
• He visited al Qaeda cells in the USA in 1998;
• He had served on the Taliban's front lines against the Northern Alliance in 1999;
• He had commanded a group of fighters in the Tora Bora region during the Taliban's retreat'
• He knew several senior al Qaeda leaders;
• He was close to UBL;
• He served as UBL's interpreter;
• and that he "has traveled to Romania where he was introduced to humanitarian organizations including the Islamic Heritage Revival and the Islamic Relief Organization."
  
  A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Al Madani Sawad's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 20 October 2006. The memo listed 33 factors favoring his continued detention. The memo listed 5 factors favoring release or transfer. Among the new factors favoring his continued detention:
• Captive 239 was said to be the sole person UBL could call upon who was fluent in both Arabic and English.
• Captive 239 was captured in Jalalabad, with other fleeing Tora Bora
  
  If Aamer is released where should he go? Both the British and Saudi governments have suggested they'll take him. The Saudis hinted they'd put Aamer in a program to rehabilitate extremists, a program that often doesn't work. Meanwhile, some U.S. officials worry that U.K. authorities are too taxed to keep an eye on him. Indeed, Aamer's lawyer says British authorities have promised he won't be monitored there. A British Embassy spokesman in D.C. said, "Our request for his release was made in light of his status as a former legal resident … and due to our wish to see the closure of Guantánamo Bay."