Thank God only 48 days to go to the end of the "regime"!
Inauguration Jan. 20, 2017
Trump was born June 14, 1946.
On Jan. 20, 2017 he will be 70 years, 7 months and 7 days old. 7 is God's number of completion.
Posted 2010/12/20
A couple of months ago, when I told General Krulak, the former Commandant of the Marine Corps, now the chair of the Naval Academy Board of Visitors, that we were having General Mattis speak this evening, he said, “Let me tell you a Jim Mattis story.”
General Krulak said, when he was Commandant of the Marine Corps, every year, starting about a week before Christmas, he and his wife would bake hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of Christmas cookies. They would package them in small bundles.
Then on Christmas day, he would load his vehicle. At about 4 a.m., General Krulak would drive himself to every Marine guard post in the Washington-Annapolis-Baltimore area and deliver a small package of Christmas cookies to whatever Marines were pulling guard duty that day. He said that one year, he had gone down to Quantico as one of his stops to deliver Christmas cookies to the Marines on guard duty. He went to the command center and gave a package to the lance corporal who was on duty.
He asked, “Who’s the officer of the day?” The lance corporal said, “Sir, it’s Brigadier General Mattis.”
And General Krulak said, “No, no, no. I know who General Mattis is. I mean, who’s the officer of the day today, Christmas day?”
The lance corporal, feeling a little anxious, said, “Sir, it is Brigadier General Mattis.”
General Krulak said that, about that time, he spotted in the back room a cot, or a daybed. He said, “No, Lance Corporal. Who slept in that bed last night?”
The lance corporal said, “Sir, it was Brigadier General Mattis.”
About that time, General Krulak said that General Mattis came in, in a duty uniform with a sword, and General Krulak said, “Jim, what are you doing here on Christmas day? Why do you have duty?” General Mattis told him that the young officer who was scheduled to have duty on Christmas day had a family, and General Mattis decided it was better for the young officer to spend Christmas Day with his family, and so he chose to have duty on Christmas Day.
A couple of months ago, when I told General Krulak, the former Commandant of the Marine Corps, now the chair of the Naval Academy Board of Visitors, that we were having General Mattis speak this evening, he said, “Let me tell you a Jim Mattis story.”
General Krulak said, when he was Commandant of the Marine Corps, every year, starting about a week before Christmas, he and his wife would bake hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of Christmas cookies. They would package them in small bundles.
Then on Christmas day, he would load his vehicle. At about 4 a.m., General Krulak would drive himself to every Marine guard post in the Washington-Annapolis-Baltimore area and deliver a small package of Christmas cookies to whatever Marines were pulling guard duty that day. He said that one year, he had gone down to Quantico as one of his stops to deliver Christmas cookies to the Marines on guard duty. He went to the command center and gave a package to the lance corporal who was on duty.
He asked, “Who’s the officer of the day?” The lance corporal said, “Sir, it’s Brigadier General Mattis.”
And General Krulak said, “No, no, no. I know who General Mattis is. I mean, who’s the officer of the day today, Christmas day?”
The lance corporal, feeling a little anxious, said, “Sir, it is Brigadier General Mattis.”
General Krulak said that, about that time, he spotted in the back room a cot, or a daybed. He said, “No, Lance Corporal. Who slept in that bed last night?”
The lance corporal said, “Sir, it was Brigadier General Mattis.”
About that time, General Krulak said that General Mattis came in, in a duty uniform with a sword, and General Krulak said, “Jim, what are you doing here on Christmas day? Why do you have duty?” General Mattis told him that the young officer who was scheduled to have duty on Christmas day had a family, and General Mattis decided it was better for the young officer to spend Christmas Day with his family, and so he chose to have duty on Christmas Day.
General Krulak said, “That’s the kind of officer that Jim Mattis is.”
The story above was told by Dr. Albert C. Pierce, the Director of the Center for the Study of Professional Military Ethics at The United States Naval Academy. He was introducing General James Mattis who gave a lecture on Ethical Challenges in Contemporary Conflict in the spring of 2006. This was taken from the transcript of that lecture.
America knows Gen.
James Mattis as a character, Mad Dog Mattis, (he only likes to be called Mad Dog by the combat marines he served with and of course "The Donald"). the font of funny quotes and Chuck
Norris-caliber memes. Those of us who served with him know that he is a caring,
erudite, warfighting general. We also know that there is a reason he uses the
call-sign Chaos: he is a lifelong student of his profession, a devotee of maneuver warfare
and Sun Tzu, the sort of guy who wants to win without fighting—to cause chaos
among those he would oppose.
To Marines, he is the finest of our tribal elders. The rest of the world, very
soon, will know how truly gifted he is. Our friends and allies will be happy he
is our new secretary of war; our enemies will soon wish he weren’t.
I
worked for Mattis three times: when he was a colonel, a major general, and a
lieutenant general. I very much want to work for him again. Here is why.
One: July 1994
I
checked into Third Battalion, Seventh Marines in Twenty nine Palms, California
in 1994. It was 125 degrees in July in the high desert; everyone was in the
field. This was a hard place, for hard men training for the hardest of jobs.
Then-Colonel Mattis, the Seventh
Marines regimental commander, called for me to come see him. I was not only
just a brand-new captain, but an aviator in an infantry regiment. I was a minor
light in the Seventh Marines firmament: I was not in any
measure a key player.
I
arrived early, as a captain does when reporting to a colonel, and waited in his
anteroom. There, I convinced myself what this would be: a quick handshake, a
stern few sentences on what I was to do while there, and then a slap on the
back with a “Go get ‘em, Tiger!” as he turned to the next task at hand. This
was a busy guy. Five minutes, tops.
Colonel
Mattis called for me. He stood to greet me, and offered to get coffee for me.
He put a hand on my shoulder; gave me, over my protestations, his own seat
behind his desk; and pulled up a chair to the side. He actually took his phone
off the hook—something I had thought was just a figure of speech—closed his
office door, and spent more than an hour knee-to-knee with me.
Mattis
laid out his warfighting philosophy, vision, goals, and expectations. He told
me how he saw us fighting and where, and how he was getting us ready to do just
that. He laid out history, culture, religion, and politics, and he saw very
clearly not only where we would fight, but how Seventh Marines, a desert
battalion, fit into that fight.
Many
years later, when Seventh Marines got into that fight, he was proven precisely
right. It would not be the last time.
Two: February 2003
Major
Gen. Mattis was commanding general of First Marine Division, in charge of the
riflemen who were going to bear the brunt of President George W. Bush’s
decision to go to war. He was small, wiry, and feisty, energy cooking off of
him, the sort of guy who walks into a room of Alpha males and is instantly the
leader. Mattis was a lifelong bachelor married to the Marine Corps, with a
reputation as an ass-kicking, ferocious leader, an officer who took shit from
no man and would do anything for his Marines.
Mattis
had led First Battalion, Seventh Marines as part of Task Force Ripper during
Desert Storm, and had cemented his reputation as a man on the way up. This
reputation, well-earned even then, was solidified when he took Task Force 58,
pulled together from two Marine Expeditionary Unit afloat, 400 miles over
Pakistan and into Afghanistan late in 2001 to retaliate on behalf of us all
against al-Qaeda’s attacks on September 11. He was a blunt, smart warfighter,
just the sort of man our bulldog savior, Gen. Al Gray, had started pulling up
the ladder behind him when he was commandant in the late 1980s.
I felt very confident with these two major generals—Mattis of the infantry and
Amos of the air wing—in charge. And I felt even more confident as I looked
around the room.
The
metal folding chairs held hundreds of men. Pilots were in tan flight suits,
pistols hanging on their chests in shoulder holsters. Infantry officers sat
farther back; these were battalion fire support coordinators, seasoned majors
who commanded a rifle battalion’s weapons company (heavy guns, 81 mm mortars,
rockets, and TOW missiles) and were therefore the key men in a battalion’s fire
support planning.
These
guys were firsts among equals, and were almost always the best and often most
senior of the young officers in a battalion. Most had with him his battalion
air officer, an aviator serving with a rifle battalion (as I had with 3/7 under
Col. Mattis) responsible for coordinating air strikes with the infantry’s
scheme of maneuver and the indirect fire of both mortars and artillery.
The
senior aviators, squadron and group commanders, sat near the front, with their
counterpart battalion and regimental infantry commanders. Lieutenant colonels
and colonels sat in front, captains and majors filling in the rear: hair atop
heads grew noticeably more sparse the further forward you looked. Heads shined,
and jaws firmly set. Showtime.
The
discussions began with an intel brief. The first bad guys we were going to come
across, and those we were therefore most concerned about, were the Iraqi 51st
Mechanized Division. They were not the Republican Guard, but had a reputation
as having some tough fighters who could shoot straight. The word was that officers
were taking all civilian clothes from their men and having them burned, to
prevent the conscripts from stripping off their uniforms and fleeing the war,
trying to blend back into the civilian population.
On
our side, they were expecting Seventh Marines to be ready to go on 10 March,
Fifth Marines ready to go on 20 March, and First Marines ready to go in a
month: 1 March. A-day and G-Day would go simultaneously. My ears perked up at
this. No pre-invasion bombing? I was expecting the air war to start up any day,
to soften the bad guys up for at least month as we did the first time we kicked
this Iraqi Army’s ass in 1991.
No
air war? Wow. The briefer didn’t come out and say “You grunts are screwed,” but
rather used intelspeak: “We anticipate at this time that there will be no
formalized shaping of the battlefield.” Rules of engagement would be fairly
relaxed: kill people if they need killin’. Maps were flashed up, showing the
initial Battlespace Coordination Line (BCL): we were given permission to kill
anything beyond that line. This was going to be a huge, high-stakes shooting
gallery.
Logistics was going to be an issue. It was a long way to Baghdad from there,
and there were a hell of a lot of guys massing on the border. When Mattis took
the boys into Afghanistan, it took 0.5 short tons (a “short ton” is 2,000
pounds even, versus a “ton,” which is closer to 2,200 pounds) per Marine
deployed. They were expecting that it would be five times that effort—2.5 short
tons per Marine—to get a guy to Baghdad. I remembered that Gen. Krulak, our
commandant in the late 1990s, had made his reputation as a logistics wizard in
Desert Storm.
Good officers study military history,
great officers study logistics. Mattis was a great officer.
His “Log Light” configuration for
the division was meant to get people north fast, and not try to shoot our way
through every little town on the way. As only he could do, he described it
thus: “If you can’t eat it, shoot it, or wear it, don’t bring it.”
Mattis stood. As always, he spoke
without notes, having long ago memorized everything.
“Gentlemen, this is going to be the
most air-centric division in the history of warfare. Don’t you worry about the
lack of shaping; if we need to kill something, it is going to get killed. I
would storm the gates of Hell if Third Marine Air Wing was overhead.”
He looked toward the back of the
cavernous room, and spoke loud, clear, and confident, hands on his hips.
“There is one way to have a short
but exciting conversation with me,” he continued, “and that is to move too
slow. Gentlemen, this is not a marathon, this is a sprint. In about a month, I
am going to go forward of our Marines up to the border between Iraq and Kuwait.
And when I get there, one of two things is going to happen. Either the
commander of the Fifty-First Mechanized Division is going to surrender his army
in the field to me, or he and all his guys are going to die.”
Nothing much else needed to be said
after that.
Three: March 2003
Early in the afternoon, every British and American officer loaded
up and headed across the desert to the marvelously named Camp Matilda, one of
the Marine Corps base camps farther north towards Iraq. This was my first foray
out into the open desert, and it was a National
Geographic special
come to life.
Camels ambled along next to the
road or stood and stared stupidly at the cars whizzing by mere feet away. I
assumed they would be herded by men in flowing robes on camels, like in
“Lawrence of Arabia.” The men indeed wore robes and flowing headdresses, but
herded their beasts in pickup trucks. Wealthier Kuwaitis zoomed by in
red-checked caftans driving the ubiquitous Mercedes sedan.
Without referencing a single piece of
paper, he discussed what each unit would do and in what sequence, and outlined
his end state for each phase of the early war.
First Marine Division was holding
their first ROC Drill, the rehearsal of concept of what we were about to do. I
had never seen a walk-through like this before. Marines had spent days building
an enormous reproduction of southern Iraq in a bowl formed by a huge,
semicircular sand dune. Each road, each river, each canal, each oil field was
built to scale and even in proper color (water was blue dye poured into a sand
ditch, and so on.)
Each Marine unit wore football
jerseys in different colors, and with proper numbers. First Battalion, Fifth
Marines, known as one-five, wore blue jerseys with “15” on the back, and other
units were similarly identified. Principal staff from those units stood on the
“border” drawn in the sand. About 300 officers stood and sat on the dune above.
It was the perfect way to visualize what was about to happen.
General Mattis stood up and took a
handheld microphone. Without referencing a single piece of paper, he discussed
what each unit would do and in what sequence, and outlined his end state for
each phase of the early war. He spoke for nearly 30 minutes, and his complete
mastery of every nuance of the battle forthcoming was truly impressive.
A narrator then took over and
picked up the narrative, the rest of the first week of the early war in
sequence. As he described each movement, the officers from that unit walked to
the proper place on their terrain model, and by the end of an hour the colored
jerseys were spread over nearly a football field’s worth of sand. What a show.
At the end of the drill, questions
were answered and then Mattis dismissed everyone. No messing around with this
guy. Mike Murdoch, one of the British company commanders, leaned over to me,
his eyes wide. “Mate, are all your generals that good?”
I looked at him.
“No. He is the best we have.”
As everyone rose to leave, Mattis
fired one last directive over the microphone: “You’ve got about 30 days.”
Stanton S.
Coerr was a Marine officer and is a veteran of the war in Iraq. He holds
degrees from Duke, Harvard, and the Naval War College, and now lives and works
in Washington DC
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